Much of what Mr. Brunelli suggests in his article is valid.  Access to low cost, high quality EV batteries is essential to the future of U.S. carmakers.  If Chinese carmakers have long-term access to higher quality and lower cost batteries than U.S. carmakers, the U.S. automotive industry will be in grave trouble.  NAATBatt has long warned that “He who makes the batteries will one day make the cars.”  In fact, that was one of NAATBatt’s original tag lines in 2009 (a tag line that generated considerable push-back from major U.S. auto companies at the time).

Yet while Mr. Brunelli is correct in suggesting that U.S. automakers need access to the best and lowest cost EV batteries and that the best and lowest cost EV batteries today are made in China, there is a danger that if U.S. and other auto makers come to rely exclusively or nearly exclusively on Chinese batteries, they will be facilitating the creation of a Chinese battery cartel.  That cartel, if it forms and exercises its resulting market power, can push U.S. and other non-Chinese car makers out of the vehicle market just as effectively as if those carmakers could not compete on price.

U.S. policy today seems focused on keeping Chinese batteries, battery technology and EV’s out of the U.S. market.  I agree with Mr. Brunelli that this focus is misplaced.  The focus should be less on keeping Chinese products out of the U.S. than on making sure that the Chinese products that do come in face viable competition from multiple other sources of supply.  U.S. battery policy should focus less on local protectionism than on squarely preventing the “cartelization” of the battery market.

Protecting U.S. companies and consumers from the dangers of a cartel is not a new concern.   NAATBatt was formed 18 years ago for the purpose of helping to break the power of OPEC over the U.S. economy by introducing another form of fuel to the vehicle sector.  This purpose was soon overshadowed by the fight against climate change.  But first and foremost, NAATBatt was about remediating the impact of a foreign oil cartel on the U.S. economy.

There are two ways to prevent the cartelization of advanced battery supply in North America.  The first is to support the development of multiple sources of battery manufacturing, battery material and battery technology all around the world.  While it would be most beneficial if those sources were located in North America, from the standpoint of fighting cartelization, it does not matter from where those competing supplies come.  It just matters those sources of competing supplies exist.  To that end, the U.S. should be just as interested in supporting the advanced battery industries in Korea and Japan as it should be in building battery manufacturing plants in North America (batteries for defense and critical infrastructure applications, of course, being a different issue).

The second way to prevent the cartelization of batteries is to promote diversity in battery technology.  NAATBatt’s 2025 Sodium-Zinc Battery Workshop recently concluded in Los Angeles.  Many of the workshop presentations pointed out that though sodium and zinc-based technologies have received only a fraction of the attention and investment of lithium-based batteries, they can perform many of the same energy storage applications as can lithium-ion.  Several speakers noted that it is not necessary, for example, that sodium-ion batteries be better than lithium-ion batteries.  It is only necessary that they be able to power some of the same applications as lithium-ion batteries at a price that is at least somewhat competitive.  The price does not really need to be lower.  It is the presence of a viable alternative to lithium that matters.  For it is the mere existence of alternatives that prevents cartels from forming and exercising harmful market power.

So the good news is that the U.S. advanced battery industry should be able to have its cake and eat it too.  There should be nothing wrong with importing Chinese batteries or battery-related technology.  U.S. automakers probably need to do so, at least in the short term.  But in so doing, U.S. industry and the U.S. government must be keenly focused on making sure that Chinese battery companies have viable competitors in the U.S. market and that U.S. battery customers have practical technological alternatives to lithium-ion technology.

The United States lags dangerously behind China in the development of an advanced battery industry.  This lag endangers the U.S. economy threatening the long-term loss of a domestic automobile industry.  It also endangers U.S. national security by ensuring that U.S. warfighters will be using less advanced and less powerful electronic gear than their potential adversaries.

The U.S. strategy for addressing this dangerous deficiency relies heavily on persuading U.S. allies that have technical knowledge and experience in advanced battery technology to help the U.S. build a secure and robust domestic lithium-ion battery supply chain.  Foremost among those allies has been the Republic of Korea.  Korean companies have a competence and experience in lithium battery manufacturing technology on par with the Chinese.  For the past several years, U.S. industrial policy has focused on persuading Korean companies not just to make investments in U.S. but to send trained experts in battery technology to the United States to help build the U.S. industry and train the U.S. workforce.

The arrests, deportations and humiliations in Ellabell, Georgia were nothing short of a disaster in U.S. industrial policy.  The deportation of 300 potential trainers was a shameful own goal. Those actions subverted longstanding U.S. efforts to build a domestic lithium-ion battery supply chain and jeopardize U.S. defense and economic security objectives.  Something went badly wrong on September 4.  It is important to figure out exactly what happened and to fix it.

Analysis of the Ellabell disaster is hampered by the lack of detailed information about exactly what happened.  It appears, perhaps, that most of the Korean workers were employed in tasks for which local U.S. workers were not trained.  It also appears, perhaps, that the work papers of most of those workers were technically defective.

If those assumptions are true, then the question is: whose fault was that the work papers were defective?  If the presence of Korean workers in Georgia was important to U.S. industrial policy, it was the responsibility of the U.S. government to make sure that those work papers were good.  Any defects should have been resolved through administrative with the full assistance of the federal government.  The fact that they were resolved through a police raid and deportation smacks of gross incompetence. Ellabell was black eye for America.

At the same time, local U.S. laborers need to be assured that Korean and other foreign laborers working on battery projects are bringing specialized expertise to battery projects in the United States and are not just displacing general domestic labor.  The purpose of admitting foreign laborers into the United States should be to train domestic laborers and to encourage the immigration of skilled workers.  The U.S. visa system should provide this assurance.  The Ellabell disaster clearly demonstrates that it does not.

The U.S. government and U.S. industry need to work together to overhaul the standards for qualifying and admitting to the United States the trained workers who are needed to establish strategic industries.  The Ellabell disaster seriously undermined this objective.  We need to do better.

Of course, networking is a big part of PowerTrips programs.  Each PowerTrip features a networking lunch or dinner sponsored by the host member.  These meals and breaks during the program allow attendees to get to know the host’s personnel and the personnel of other attendees and explore areas of common business interest.  There is something about meeting industry colleagues during a hands-on manufacturing demonstration that spurs a lot more productive discussion than what occurs at a trade show exhibit booth.  An amazing amount of business gets done during NAATBatt PowerTrip programs, both among attendees and the host and among attendees themselves.

The Rockwell PowerTrip program set a high bar for NAATBatt’s relaunch of the PowerTrip series.  More than 40 NAATBatt member attendees toured several demonstration manufacturing lines and learned how Rockwell Automation technology improves the speed and efficiency of manufacturing processes.  Attendees also heard presentations by senior Rockwell executives, including Rockwell Chairman and CEO, Blake Moret.  The executive presentations covered a wide range of Rockwell interests from emerging manufacturing technology to workforce training.  It was a very interesting and productive day.

Other highlights of the tour included a visit to Rockwell’s 71,800 square foot green roof and a reception atop Rockwell’s landmark Clock Tower, with a truly stunning view of Milwaukee and Lake Michigan.  The reception was punctuated by what appeared to me to be numerous discussions and new business deals being formulated among NAATBatt member attendees.

The success and productivity of the Rockwell PowerTrip virtually ensures that NAATBatt will continue this program.  If you did not join us in Milwaukee, you really missed something special.  Don’t miss the next one.

If you are a Platinum level NAATBatt member and are interested in hosting a NAATBatt PowerTrip program, please contact Paula Szyper or Jim Greenberger.  We hope to announce the next PowerTrip meeting soon.

But the loss of manufacturing itself is not the crisis.  The crisis is the loss of investment in manufacturing infrastructure.  Manufacturing lithium batteries, like any other product, cannot be established and sustained in the United States unless investors can see a path to profitable investment in the sector.

Over the past decade, Congress has taken steps to make that path more evident to investors in advanced battery manufacturing.  Investors have responded by investing billions of dollars in new manufacturing infrastructure and creating thousands of jobs.  Advanced lithium batteries are a core, strategic technology of the 21^st Century.  They are a ubiquitous technological tool that power and improve the performance of thousands of products large and small.

Reducing tax incentives for investors in advanced battery manufacturing would be a costly and counterproductive mistake.  Reducing incentives would not only stymie investment in the short term, but would by withdrawing retrospectively incentives on which investors have already relied compromise the long-term appeal of investing in manufacturing in the United States.

NAATBatt and its 380-member businesses applaud efforts to bring fiscal responsibility to the federal budget.  Everyone who runs a business knows the importance of fiscal responsibility.  But NAATBatt is gravely concerned that short-term budget math not compromise the long-term goal of rebuilding the U.S. manufacturing base.  If it does, the deficit will grow larger, not smaller, and become increasingly difficult to address.

NAATBatt urges Congress to make American manufacturing great again by retaining for investors the tax incentives necessary to build and sustain new advanced battery manufacturing capacity in the United States.

But in trying to return manufacturing to the United States through tariffs, the Administration may be confusing a symptom with the disease.  The disease is not a lack of manufacturing in the United States.  The disease is that the United States is underinvesting in manufacturing infrastructure.  That underinvestment has led to the symptom of a declining manufacturing sector in general and to the lack of advanced battery manufacturing in the United States in particular.

Advanced battery manufacturing will not take place in the United States just because we want it to or because the government imposes a tariff on importers.  Manufacturing will only take place if investors fund the construction of new battery manufacturing plants and related supply chain infrastructure.  Today, building a Gigafactory requires about a billion dollars of investment, two to three years of construction, and at least 10 years of profitable operation in order for investors to get a favorable return on their investment.

Unless an investor can see a pathway to profitability for that Gigafactory over time, no investment will be made, no factory will be built, and no manufacturing will return to America.

Tariffs can in theory help investors see that pathway to profitability by protecting a Gigafactory project from low-price foreign competition.  But for tariffs to be effective in promoting investment, they need to be “sticky”.  In other words, investors need to have confidence that the tariff regime will remain in place during the entire period that the project needs to operate in order to produce a favorable return on investment.

President Trump’s problem is that while he can impose tariffs at will, he cannot make them stick.  Investors know this.  Given that major portions of the business community, Wall Street, a large majority of Democrats, and a significant number of Republicans oppose the Trump tariffs, the best that President Trump can do is hold his tariff regime in place for four years.  Four years is just not enough time to support the financing of a new battery Gigafactory, or probably any factory that manufactures advanced technology or heavy industry products.

The Trump Administration needs to start over.  Before imposing a tariff regime, it needs to build a political consensus in favor of the kind of tariffs the President wants to impose.  Only if the tariffs have broad political backing will investors trust that they can survive long enough to benefit their investments.

Building a political consensus supporting tariffs means reaching out to the business community, to Wall Street and even to Democrats to sell the potential benefits of the Trump tariff program.  This needs to be done before that program is enacted, not after.  If President Trump is unable or unwilling to build such a consensus, his tariff regime will fail in its intended purpose.  Unpopular tariffs might raise a few dollars for the federal government in the short term.  But they will not return manufacturing investment or manufacturing itself to America.

Participating members had the opportunity to attend InterBattery 2025, the second largest battery conference in Asia (after CIBF in Shenzhen, China) and meet a wide with a range of Asian battery and battery component manufacturers.  The NAATBatt InterBattery program allowed members to interact directly with decision-makers at the large Korean battery companies.  Those decision-makers tend to be located in Korea, not in North America.  The Onshoring Battery Technology Committee’s InterBattery program gave NAATBatt members an opportunity to interact with those decision-makers in a way that North American battery trade shows do not.

InterBattery 2025 was also an opportunity for the NAATBatt Offshoring Battery Technology Committee to speak with Asian companies that might be considering opening or expanding operations in North America.  The Onshoring Battery Technology Committee’s mission is to help companies from outside of North America more easily move operations to North America and connect with potential partners, suppliers and service providers within the NAATBatt membership.

NAATBatt also participated in the U.S. EV Forum organized by the U.S. Embassy in Seoul in connection with the InterBattery 2025 conference.  A large number of Korean battery companies attended the forum, including representatives of the three major Korean battery manufacturers.

I was asked to make remarks at the Forum on behalf of NAATBatt.  I sensed that the Korean battery companies were interested in what I had to say, particularly to the extent my remarks related to the battery policy of the new Trump Administration.  As expected, the Korean battery industry does not know what to make of the major policy announcements related to trade and manufacturing, which seem to change rapidly and appear impossible to predict.

In my remarks I told the Korean audience that I could offer no clarity with respect to U.S. policies affecting battery production, including tariffs, the future of the Inflation Reduction Act or the survival chances of various battery manufacturing tax incentives.  I offered the prediction, however, that the frenetic pace of announcements was likely to slow (if out of exhaustion, if nothing else) and a consistent policy toward manufacturing should soon emerge.  That said, I told the Koreans that I cannot predict what that consistent, less frenetic policy is going to be.

I pointed out, however, that whatever the details of the ultimate government policy will be, the basic strategy that the United States, and its interest in attracting Korean manufacturers to the United States, is clear and unlikely to change.  That strategy has three elements.

First, the United States needs to acquire know-how in advanced battery manufacturing, which it by and large does not have today.  That know-how resides in Asia, much of it in Korea.  The United States will continue to reach out to companies in Korea in order to incent them to share that knowledge with U.S. engineers and technicians.  The transfer of know-how, however, will not be a one-way street.  Korean companies should reasonable expect to share in the markets, culture of innovation and world-class research capabilities that U.S. companies and research institutions can provide to them.  The transfer of know-how that the U.S. desires will require a partnership.

The second element of the U.S. strategy is the need to build North American battery manufacturing to scale.  It is abundantly clear that the winners in the world-wide competition for dominance of the lithium battery and automotive markets will be those companies, and those countries, that can produce high-quality products at the lowest cost.  The primacy of low cost in this competition is at this point beyond question.

Manufacturing batteries at the lowest possible cost involves many factors.  But the one indispensable factor is that manufacturing must take place at scale.  Without the ability to amortize the huge capital costs of manufacturing lithium batteries over very large-scale production, making the lowest cost lithium battery will be near to impossible.

China is a case in point.  The Chinese lead the world today in battery manufacturing principally because they have leveraged the scale of the largest EV market in the world in order to reduce the cost of the lithium batteries their companies produce.  This strategy has worked well for the Chinese.  But here is a secret:  As large as the Chinese auto market is, the combined potential EV markets in the United States, Europe, Japan and Korea are even larger.  If those markets can somehow be consolidated, the United States, Europe, Japan and Korea can recapture the advantage of scale from the Chinese.  But this too will require a partnership.

The third element is securing the supply chain for lithium battery materials and components.  Back in the 1970’s, the United States became highly dependent upon a commodity (petroleum), which was largely controlled by a small number of foreign producers.  The United States paid a heavy price for that dependence.  Over following decades that dependence forced the U.S. to spend trillions of dollars to manage affairs in a part of the world might otherwise have had little interest to American policymakers.  The United States will never let this happen again.  But preventing its re-occurrence in the area of energy materials sector will require cooperation with nations in Asia that have, make or process the battery materials and components that the United States will need in the 21^st Century.  This too will require a partnership between U.S. and Asian firms.

Lithium battery technology is one of the most critical technologies of the 21^st Century.  It is becoming more critical by the day.  Securing the U.S. economy’s ability to manufacture that technology profitably and securely is not something that the United States can do alone.  It will require partnerships with allied nations in Asia.  No government policies, however frenetic, will change this fundamental fact.

The positive reactions to the meeting contrasted with uncertainty about the state of the industry as a whole.  No one really knows what is going on in Washington, D.C.  It appears that the Trump Administration has not yet taken a position, favorably or unfavorably, on advanced battery technology.  During a first 100 days filled with chaos and radical change, the fact that no one in the Administration seems to be paying attention to batteries may well be a good thing.

Yet while the chaos and radical change in Washington grabs headlines, the presentations made by speakers and NAATBatt member firms during the NAATBatt 2025 meeting underline the fact that Washington is a side show.  Technological advances will determine whether the manufacture of advanced battery technology in North America will be commercially successful, not government policy.  And those advances keep coming.  A session on AI in the battery industry made some interesting predictions about where the most important technology advances are likely to occur in the battery space.

The “What Would a Moonshot in Advanced Batteries Look Like” panel focused less on new technology and more on the importance and challenges of reducing cost.  A culture of innovation is the key advantage of  North American advanced battery makers.  But commercializing that innovation will remain challenging as long as oversupply in China keeps prices artificially and unsustainably low in North America.  Panel members Stan Whittingham, Craig Rigby, Joern Tinnemeyer and David Howell agreed upon the centrality of this problem, but could not agree on a solution.

The best part of NAATBatt 2025, as always, was the Member Update Presentations.  This year, 170-member companies signed up to give presentations.  Collectively those presentations provided a better understanding of who is working on what in the North American advanced battery market than any study or report.  The presentations as a whole were as inspiring as they were impressive.

2025 will likely see continued technological progress in advanced batteries and, hopefully, greater certainty about federal government policy supporting it.  NAATBatt looks forward to reviewing that progress and that certainty at its 18^th annual meeting, NAATBatt 2026, on February 9-12, 2026, at the JW Marriott Starr Pass hotel in Tucson, Arizona.